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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE 1935 AMENDMENTS OF THE RAILROAD
BANKRUPTCY LAW *
N 1933, Congress enacted a comprehensive bankruptcy statute
applying to railroads engaged in interstate commerce.1 In
1935, in light of the experience with the administration of the stat-
ute, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation 2 recommended
extensive amendments.' Congress enacted an amended statute on
August 27, 1935 ' in general accordance with the Coordinator's
* The amendments to the Railroad Bankruptcy Act passed by Congress in 1935,
Act of Aug. 27, 1935, c. 774, 49 STAT. 9ix, xi U. S. C. A. § 205 (Supp. 1935), were
largely based upon a statute recommended by Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Co-
ordinator of Transportation, and prepared by the writers of this article. -ED.
1 Act of March 3, 1933, c. 204, 47 STAT. 1474, II U. S. C. § 205 (1935).
2 The provisions of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 require
the Federal Coordinator of Transportation to submit recommendations to Congress
as to future legislation to improve transportation conditions throughout the
country. 48 STAT. 216, 49 U. S. C. § 263 ('935).
3 See Report of Coordinator, H. R. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (I935).
For the Coordinator's recommendations and the bill proposed by him, see id. at 35,
100, 229. This bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 1634 and, with certain
modifications, in the House as H. R. 6249. The Interstate Commerce Commission
had made general recommendations of similar amendments. 48 ANN. RE . I-TER-
STATE COM Mc CoMM. (1934) i7-xg. The President endorsed the proposed legis-
lation in his message of June 7, 1935.
4 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, C. 774, 49 STAT. 911, x U. S. C. A. § 205 (Supp. 1935).
The bill, H. R. 8587, received thorough consideration by the House Committee on
the Judiciary at hearings at which there was a full representation of the various
interests and as a result of which the Committee made various changes in the bill
as proposed by the Coordinator. There were appearances in the hearings before the
House Committee by the Federal Coordinator and representatives of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the 21 standard
railroad labor organizations, an association of the major life insurance companies,
the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, the Association of American
Railroads, the American Short Line Railroad Association, certain independent com-
mittees of stockholders and bondholders, and other individuals. A transcript of
these hearings was printed as Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R.
6249, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935). These hearings comprised eight days, and
the committee then considered the bill in executive session over a period of four
weeks. On June 21, 1935, the House committee reported out the bill. See H. R.
RaP. No. 1283, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (Committee on Judiciary, 1935). The bill was
passed by the House on Aug. 15, 1935. 79 CONG. Rac. 13302-o9. In the Senate,
the bill was referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce. It reported the bill
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recommendations, leaving untouched hardly a sentence of the
original Act. The purpose of this article is to consider certain of
the more important amendments.
Under the orthodox equity procedure in effect before the enact-
ment of Section 77, railroad reorganizations had been responsible
for some of the worst pages in the history of the administration of
our law.' There was general dissatisfaction with the conditions.6
Although it is not easy to appraise the situation, and the experts,
most of whom are not disinterested, disagree as to the facts and
causes, the general outlines are fairly clear. These conditions are
not only significant as indicating a past from which it is desirable
to escape through a reform to be accomplished by such legislation
as Section 77. They indicate present dangers. For, if a reorgani-
zation is not effected in bankruptcy, it is the duty of the court to
dismiss the proceedings, and the equity processes will then ensue.
Further, many railroad reorganizations are now pending in the
equity courts.'
favorably Aug. z6, 1935, after consideration in executive session. See SEN. REP. No.
1336, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (Committee on Interstate Commerce, 1935). The bill
was passed by the Senate Aug. 20, 1935, with a minor amendment which was ac-
cepted in the House. 79 CONG. REC. 13764-69. There was no opposition to the
bill on the floor of either house. On the floor of the Senate, the bill was supported
by Senator Wheeler, and by Senator Hastings of Delaware of the Republican minor-
ity, Senator Hastings having sponsored the original § 77 in the Senate in 1933.
5 See testimony of Mr. Eastman, Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on
H. R. 6249, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 14, 23. The whole subject of railroad financ-
ing is now under a comprehensive investigation by the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce.
6 See Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization (1919) 32 HAv. L. Rxv.
489; Dodd, Reorganization through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (i935) 48
id. zioo; Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power
(1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 317, 333; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects
of Corporate Reorganization (1933) i9 id. 541; LowErNrm, Tx INVE TOR PAYS
(i933); MouLTo , THE AMERIcAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM (1933) 349; 3A
SmRmAN, THE INTimsTATE ComrcE Comrrssiow (1935) 577.
7 As of March z, 1936, 92 railroad reorganizations were pending, of which 44
were under § 77, and 48 in the equity courts. The mileage of the roads under re-
organization under § 77 totaled 56,972 miles. The mileage of the roads under equity
receiverships totaled i7,95o miles. Practically all of the larger properties are in
bankruptcy proceedings. A great part of the large number of small reorganizations
pending in equity consists of suits started before § 77 was enacted. Since its enact-
ment very few proceedings in equity have been instituted. The Commission on
April 7, 1936 issued its first orders approving reorganization plans in § 77 proceed-
ings. Copper Range R. R. Reorganization, Finance Docket No. io,8io; Chicago,
S. S. & S. B. R. R. Reorganization. Finance Docket No. 1o,165.
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It seems quite generally agreed that the procedure in equity,
suitable for the reorganization of the ordinary private industrial
companies, has proved inadequate for the reorganization of cor-
porate systems of the magnitude and complexity of the typical
railroad, operating as a common carrier in as many as a dozen
states.' These reorganizations have proceeded with no proper
supervision by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Its func-
tion has been merely to approve the issuance of the securities after
the reorganization plan has been approved by the court, an inter-
position too late, and a function too limited, to be effective.' The
courts have been similarly handicapped, in that their examina-
tion of the plan has been held in connection with the sale of the
property, at a stage so late in the proceedings that they have been
naturally reluctant to break down the reorganization effort, espe-
cially where the plan is approved by substantial interests."0 Fur-
ther, the judges have frequently been unfamiliar with such com-
plex financial problems, or unduly impressed by the size of the
operation, and therefore have not had enough confidence to substi-
tute their judgment for the judgment of the professional reorgan-
izers, and to assume the responsibility involved in rejecting what
they have proposed.1
8 The complexity of a typical railroad reorganization is shown by the following
data concerning the pending Missouri Pacific reorganization, the figures being ap-
proximate figures: debtor corporations before the court, 8; corporations involved
including wholly owned subsidiaries and leased lines, not all before the court, 31;
miles of line, 1o,2oo; states in which operated, ii; total capitalization, approxi-
mately $700,000,000; bondholders, 5o,oo; stockholders, o,ooo; general unsecured
creditors, between 2oo and 3000; different kinds of stock, 33; different kinds of in-
debtedness, 84; mortgages protecting bonds in the hands of the public, 17; equip-
ment trusts, ii.
9 , The Commission has not rejected outright any of the forty odd plans sub-
mitted to it since 1920, though in a few cases it has required minor changes."
MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 325. For discussion of function and action
of the Commission, see Note (93i) 44 HARv. L. REv. 838.
10 See Frank, supra note 6, at 56S, 7XI, 712; MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 353.
11 The federal judges have been disinclined to examine reorganization plans
thoroughly. 79 CONG. R c. 13764 (1935). The Commission attempted to intercede
in the reorganization case of an important western line, in the effort to secure a scru-
tiny of the plan by a federal judge recognized as having had wide experience with
railroad reorganizations. He told the Commission that only younger or less expe-
rienced judges could be expected to accede to such a request, and that in the light of
his experience with these cases, if the nlan were approved by a sufficient part of the
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The result has been that the reorganization accomplished under
this procedure has frequently expressed the conventionalized
thinking of the banker groups, who dominated the reorganization,
in which there has been neither a proper reflection of the concep-
tions of the judicial statesmanship essential to the adequate ad-
justment of issues of such importance and involving such great
sums, nor a real appreciation of the fiduciary relationship between
those dominating the settlement of these conflicting claims and
the owners of such claims. The reorganization plans have been
the result of a process of bargaining between interests of unequal
bargaining power, rather than of a process primarily one of ad-
judication. Often, committees purporting to represent security
holders have been neither disinterested nor independent, and not
infrequently they have represented conflicting interests. The ex-
pensiveness of the procedure, due in part to the extravagant fees
allowed to reorganization managers, trustees, and counsel, and in
part to the old-fashioned technique, has been notorious.' Such
conditions have put in jeopardy the rights of hundreds of thou-
sands of creditors and investors who ordinarily are scattered, un-
informed, and disorganized, and who can readily be misled or
coerced."3
Frequently the reorganization has resulted in unsound capital
structures detrimental to the investors and to the interest which
the general public has in these quasi-public corporations. 4 These
creditors, he would not interfere. See also Frank, supra note 6, at 711, 712; MoUL-
TON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 353.
12 Cf. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. R., 282 U. S. 311 (i931);
see H. R. REP. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 6; LowExTUAL, TnE INVESTOR
PAYS 255; MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 349.
23 See Eastman, C., dissenting, in Chicago, M. & St. P. Reorganization, 131
I. C. C. 673, 701 (1928). The acquiescence of uninformed creditors and stock-
holders is ordinarily no real indication of the fairness of a plan. LowErNmam, TnE
INVESTOR PAYS 292; Frank, supra note 6, at 541; MOULTON, Op. cit. supra note 6,
at 355. See, generally, BERLE AND MANS, THE MODERN CoRPoRATON Am PRiVATz
PROPERTY (1932).
14 See generally MOu.TON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 321 et seq. The reorganiza-
tions have been criticised as not providing for a proper reduction of fixed charges.
"In the Milwaukee case [i54 I. C. C. 586 (1929)] there was an increase of interest
charges from 21.5 million dollars to 22.8 million, inclusive of interest on income
bonds. In the case of the Denver and Rio Grande Western three successive reor-
ganization plans were approved within the space of three years. [70 I. C. C. 102
(1921) ; 82 I. C. C. 745 (1923) ; and 90 I. C. C. 141 (1924)]. The first effected no
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corporations are public service companies. They afford arteries
essential for the flow of national commerce. The bad effect of
unsound capital structures upon their quasi-public functions has
many ramifications. It is reflected importantly in the poor credit
of the companies and their consequent inability to finance them-
selves readily and cheaply, and in their operating inefficiency,
when, because of heavy fixed charges due to large capital bur-
dens, an undue part of their earnings is diverted from maintenance
and improvements. For many years the over-capitalization of
certain railroads has been the outstanding source of public criti-
cism and suspicion of all railroads. The efficiency and prosperity
of some of the best railroads is attributable in large measure to
sound reorganizations.' 5 Others have never succeeded in sur-
mounting the obstacles created by unsound reorganizations. Be-
cause of the importance of sound reorganizations both to the in-
vestors and to the public, because of the immense investments
involved, and because of the vulnerability of the litigants, the
necessity of providing effective administrative machinery and
sound reorganization principles has been peculiarly apparent.
Section 77 was hurriedly enacted in the last days of the Hoover
administration in the effort to remedy these defects. Although
it was not then regarded as a mature piece of legislation,"6 and in
spite of its faults, it was comprehensive, constructive, and pro-
gressive. It insured a reflection of the public interest by introduc-
ing a supervisory direction early in the proceedings. The influ-
reduction of fixed charges, and the second did not bring them within the probable
earning capacity of the road, as was admitted in connection with the third reor-
ganization, less than a year later." MouLToN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 333. Also,.
see H. R. Doc. No. 89, 74 th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) zOo,. Surveys of the recent
railroad reorganizations indicate that they have generally been favorable to the
equity holders at the expense of the bondholders. See Bonbright and Bergerman,
Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reor-
ganization (1928) 28 COL. L. Ray. 127; Buscheck, A Formula for the Judicial Reor-
ganization of Public Service Corporations (1932) 32 id. 964-68; DzvwnG, FIANcIAL.
POLICY OF CoRPoR~ATIONS (1934).
15 The Union Pacific, Santa Fe, and Norfolk and Western are examples.
16 This was indicated in the statement of Senator Hastings in the Senate during
its consideration of the amendments. See 79 CONG. Rac. 13766 (1935). See also the
letter of the Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Committee to the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, dated Jan. 31, 1933, p. 31, in which it
indicated the view that the time was too short to perfect the draft of § 77 as origi-
nally passed.
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ence of the Commission was brought to bear by requiring its
approval, after hearings, of any plan before it could be approved
by the court. A major improvement permitted the confirmation
of reorganization plans over the protest of dissenting interests,
whether creditor or stockholder, thus minimizing the obstructive
powers of minorities. The administration of reorganizations was
improved by vesting control of the entire property of the carrier
in a single federal court and by giving the Commission and the
court supervision of fees and expenses." A comprehensive system
of reorganization under the bankruptcy power was provided.
The recent amendments are designed to make the Act more
effective in the light of the experience with its use. The railroads,
under the coincidence of the depression and the sharp effective-
ness of the new competition of motor and other carriers, are now
in the worst crisis of their history. They have been unable to
secure the needed economies obtainable through such co6rdinative
measures as saved the British railroads from government owner-
ship, because of the labor limitations in the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933,18 and a stubbornly conventional in-
sistence by the public and by many of the managements upon the
fullest measure of competitive action. Even with the aid afforded
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a very substantial
part of the mileage of the country is now in bankruptcy or under
reorganization in the equity courts. 9 Consequently, an efficient
reorganization machinery is now necessary.
When a new system of procedure is established, changing the
established processes as radically as Section 77 did, it necessarily
passes through an early period when it is untried and has not been
accepted by the bar, and when there is uncertainty due to the fact
that the precedents, yet to be established in its early interpreta-
tion and administration, are as important as the terms of the
statute itself. The recent amendments have been made when that
period was only well started. At this stage the possible alterna-
tives open were: (i) to amend the Act, (2) to repeal it, (3) to
repeal it and substitute a codification of equity procedure, and
17 Subdivisions (d), (e), and (g), respectively, of § 77.
18 48 STAT. 213, 49 U. S. C. § 257 (1935).
19 On March I, 1936, a total of 74,922 miles of road owned was involved in re-
organization in equity or bankruptcy.
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(4) to amend the Act and concurrently to provide a dual mecha-
nism through a codification of equity procedure.
The considerations which inclined Congress toward amend-
ments, rather than the other alternatives, were clear. There was
no demand for a restoration of the status quo through repeal of
the Act. While the bar naturally had little enthusiasm for a stat-
ute substituting an untried procedure for the established routines,
the general dissatisfaction with equity procedure and the consid-
erable measure of success of Section 77B indicated the desirabil-
ity of improvement of the Act.2" There was no reason for the
establishment of a dual mechanism. The purpose of Section 77
was to provide an improved, workable, and comprehensive ma-
chinery. Why, then, should Congress amend the Act and, in ad-
dition, provide for a codification of equity? The House com-
mittee considered and rejected a bill intended to repeal the Act
and to substitute a codification of equity procedure.2 This bill
was rested on the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the
bankruptcy power was to be abandoned.22 The House committee
was apparently unwilling, in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry." sustaining the constitution-
ality of Section 77 and strongly declaring the plenary nature of
the bankruptcy power, to commit the legislation to the narrower
and untried basis provided by the commerce power.2"
20 Section 77 is one of three similar statutes drafted with the same basic con-
ceptions. Section 77B applies to industrial companies. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), i
U. S. C. § 205 (1935). Section So applies to municipal corporations. 48 STAT. 798
(X934), II U. S. C. § 303 (1935). The decision not to repeal § 77 was influenced
by the existence of these companion acts.
21 The bill was introduced in the Senate. S. 29o6, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
No bill was introduced in the House, although it was presented for consideration to
the committee. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th
Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 164 et seq.
22 This was on the ground, among others, that reorganization in bankruptcy
would be obscured or obstructed by precedents in bankruptcy, the technique of which
was said to be geared to the winding up of affairs of small tradesmen. See Wehle,
Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act: New Legislation
Suggested (1934) 44 YALr L. J. 197, 231.
25 294 U. S. 648 (1935).
24 Such a course would necessarily have committed the reorganizations to a
period of great uncertainty arising from such debatable questions as whether the
Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce extends so far as (i) to permit
it to confer exclusive jurisdiction for railroad reorganization to the federal courts and
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The opinion that the slow progress in the reorganization cases
under Section 77 indicates that it is unworkable and cannot be
made effective and that progress is to be found in the efficiency of
the old equity process, seems to find refutation in the fact that
progress in the forty-eight cases where the reorganizations are in
equity is no more rapid than in the forty-four cases pending in
bankruptcy. The delay has been due to conditions confronting
the railroads which have resulted in such instability and uncer-
tainty 25 that neither the stockholders nor the creditors can be
reasonably sure that reorganizations, whether in bankruptcy or
equity, will not be unfavorable to their interests. A reorganiza-
tion may restore credit and value where there is a substantial
margin of profit or a fairly definite assurance of a rising income.
This was the condition existing at the time of the very successful
reorganizations accomplished after the 1893 depression. But no
such margin of profit now exists, or is in early prospect, for the
poorer railroads.26 Where there is a narrow margin of profit or
to oust state courts of the power to foreclose mortgages on property within their
jurisdiction; and (2) to authorize a plan of reorganization assented to by designated
majorities, but objected to by minorities, to become binding upon such dissenters.
See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74 th Cong., ist Sess.
(I935) 3is et seq.
25 Many elements now contribute to the instability of railroad revenues. To
what extent has the competition of the truck virtually destroyed the railroad's
property through the creation of functional depreciation? How far will that
destruction be prevented by the recent legislation providing regulation of that
competition? How far will the railroads be permitted, or willing, to effect a stabi-
lization of the industry by such coirdinative processes as were so successfully used
in England? To what extent will the railroad revenues be impaired by laws recently
passed and whose constitutionality is yet untested, such as the Guffey Coal Act, the
Social Security Act, and the Railroad Pension Act; by such pending legislation as
the Wheeler-Crosser bill (designed to prevent any laborsaving economies at any
expense to labor), the full crew bill, and the train length bill; and by the results of
investigations pending before the Interstate Commerce Commission involving the
requirement of the installation of the automatic stoker and the power reverse gear?
How rapid or steady is to be the country's recovery from the depression? Such
factors make difficult the formation of the judgment as to the earning capacity
of the carriers which is essential in testing the soundness of a reorganization plan,
and retard reorganizations whether in equity or in bankruptcy. They preclude the
conclusion that the delay in the reorganizations in bankruptcy has been due to any
inherency in the bankruptcy practice incapable of improvement by amendment.
26 " The facts as to the radical differences between these two periods are obvious
and simple. In 1894 the roads bad, roughly, gross revenues of $i,ooo,ooo,ooo, of
which they saved $3oooooooo for net, whereas in this depression, with a gross of
$3ooo,ooo,ooo, the net was approximately the same as in 1894. In other words, in
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no profit at all in the operations, credit and value will not be sub-
stantially restored, and many creditor and equity interests may
be injured, by a premature reorganization. Industrial property
can be abandoned when it does not pay operating expenses or
produce an adequate margin of return above such expenses; or
it can be sold to a different operator or for another kind of opera-
tion. But a railroad ordinarily cannot be abandoned, nor is there
a similar opportunity for its sale. This lack of freedom of action
is a condition which cannot be overlooked in the provision of ad-
ministrative process or in the consideration of its efficiency.
The amendments which were made were, speaking roughly, of
two general kinds: (a) those regarded as essential to make the
Act more workable, particularly through providing a more effec-
tive technique in the treatment of non-assenting interests; and
(b) those perhaps not essential to its workability, but designed to
improve the Act in ways suggested by the experience in its ad-
ministration (including many improvements which had been made
in Section 77B when it was enacted in 1934). This article will
be confined to a discussion of the amendments in the first group.
AMENDMENT PERTAINING TO THE REQUIREMENT
OF PROMPT REORGANIZATIONS
The Act has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Rock
Island case"7 as requiring prompt reorganizations. If not promptly
accomplished, even if the conditions were such that delay might
be in the good interest of all concerned, it was apparently the duty
of the court to dismiss the case, in which event a reorganization in
equity would ensue. But the progress in equity in these unstable
relation to gross the net today is one-third of what it was in the 'go's. You will
also note that the $3oo,ooo,ooo of net in the 'gos compared with $37,ooo,ooo in taxes,
which today amount to $275,ooo,ooo. You will note, also, that this $3oo,ooo,ooo net
compared with $446,ooo,ooo in payments to labor, which today amount to $I,5oo,-
ooo,ooo .... A reduction of all these factors to their simplest form may be made
by stating that the net in the 'gos was 28 per cent of the gross earnings, which was
a safe margin. The net today is io per cent of the gross earnings, which is an unsafe
margin. With a sufficient margin, credit can be restored by a reduction of [fixed]
charges; with an insufficient margin, no reduction of [fixed] charges can restore
credit." Dick, Scaling Down Interest (1934) 97 RAILwAY AG. 540, 54X.
27 Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. I. & Pac. Ry., 294
U. S. 648 (1935).
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times is not being found more rapid. The dismissal of the proceed-
ings in bankruptcy would, therefore, subject the reorganizations
to the inefficiencies and abuses from which it was the purpose
of Section 77 to rescue them, without accelerating their prog-
ress. The federal judges were restive under this admonition of
the Supreme Court."8 It was clear that, under certain provisions
of the Act (subsequently changed by an amendment about to be
discussed), obstructive minorities could indefinitely delay the
completion of a reorganization. It was consequently desirable
to eliminate by amendment the necessity of action where haste is
detrimental, and to make the Act more workable when conditions
are favorable for action, particularly by enabling a more effective
handling of the claims of the classes of stockholders and creditors.
In order to temper the effect of the decision in the Rock Island
case, an amendment was made providing,
"If in the light of all the existing circumstances there is undue delay
in a reasonably expeditious reorganization of the debtor, the judge, in
his discretion, shall, on motion of any party in interest or on his own
motion, after hearing and after consideration of the recommendation of
the Commission, dismiss the proceedings." 29
The effect of this amendment is not to provide a moratorium 0
but to enjoin undue delay, thereby adopting in substance the rule
28 " The present law [§ 77 prior to amendment] contemplates hasty reorganiza-
tions.... The Federal judges ... in a number of cases have issued orders indi-
cating that unless the reorganizations are promptly accomplished, the cases will be
thrown back into equity. This puts an unfortunate emphasis upon speed rather than
soundness when the act is unworkable." Senator Wheeler, in 79 CoNG. REc. 13764
(1935). Also, see H. R. RP. No. 1283, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (Committee on Judi-
ciary, 1935) 3; testimony of Mr. Eastman, in Hearings before Committee on Judi-
ciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 281; id. at 312 et seq.
29 Subdivision (g). This was substituted for subdivision (c) (7) of the original
Act which provided for the dismissal of the proceedings if the plan were not pro-
posed, accepted or approved in a reasonable time.
80 In the absence of definite moratorium provisions based upon emergency con-
ditions, bankruptcy legislation authorizing undue prolongation of the time of re-
organization would undoubtedly be violative of creditor rights under the due process
clause. Although the proceedings were in equity, the remarks of the Supreme Court
in Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (igog), are significant. The
court said: "We have no doubt, if unnecessary delays should take place, the court
would listen to an application by any creditor . . . for orders requiring the closing
of the trust as soon as might be reasonably proper. . . ." 208 U. S. at 112. See also
Feller, Moratory Legislation, A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HAv. L. Rav. io6r.
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prevailing in equity reorganizations." The Act, as amended, it
is believed, is properly conceived of as a conservation measure 32
permitting the carrier to remain under judicial control until reor-
ganization becomes possible. Whether the proceedings are in
equity or in bankruptcy, reorganization is not, as a practical mat-
ter, possible until a major portion of the creditors are willing to
proceed. The constitutional validity of bankruptcy provisions as
applied to railroads having such an objective is apparently not
open to doubt. Such protection is essential to preserve the prop-
erty. It has always been clear that in railroad reorganizations
the equity courts will not, once their jurisdiction has been invoked,
allow the property to be broken up and sold piecemeal." Failure
to afford this protection would result in the disintegration of trans-
portation facilities of vital interest to the public. The courts
have recognized the difference between private and quasi-public
businesses. While the Supreme Court has cast serious doubt
upon the validity of such use of the equity receivership where an
ordinary private corporation is concerned," it has sanctioned its
use in railroad cases. 6 The reason for this distinction lies in the
public character of the property." The issuance of receivers'
31 Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (i9o8).
32 The mere existence of a statute of this type has been said to imply a purpose
of conservation. See GLENN, LIQuiDATION (1935) § 297.
33 " The necessity for these [railroads] receiverships for sheer purposes of con-
servation, - in other words, for purposes of reorganization, the receivership being
regarded as 'the first step in the reorganization', was frankly recognized." GLENN,
LIQU-mATION § 172. See Note (930) 43 Hanv. L. REv. I298, 1301.
34 This would result through attachments or foreclosures of parts of the property.
5 "Ordinarily a creditor who seeks the appointment of receivers must reduce
his claim to judgment and exhaust his remedy at law. . . . True indeed it is that
receivers have at times been appointed even by federal courts at the suit of simple
contract creditors if the defendant was willing to waive the irregularity and to con-
sent to the decree. This is done not infrequently where the defendant is a public
service corporation and the unbroken performance of its services is in furtherance of
the public good. Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 9o, 109, IIi. It
has been done at times, though the public good was not involved, where legitimate
private interests might otherwise have suffered harm. ... We have given warning
more than once, however, that the remedy in such circumstances is not to be granted
loosely, but is to be watched with jealous eyes." Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348,
355-56 (1932). See also Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928).
38 See Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (19o8) ; GLENN, LIQuiDA-
TION § 172.
37 "All the cases in which this Court appears to have exercised this power in
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certificates to pay operating expenses, which certificates take
precedence over mortgage bonds executed prior thereto,38 is an
expression of the same reasoning. Where a reorganization is
presently impracticable because of the unwillingness of the credi-
tors to proceed with a reorganization, it seems clear that authority
may be properly granted to the court to retain jurisdiction over
the property until the situation becomes favorable to reorganiza-
tion. The scope of the bankruptcy power, discussed hereinafter,
is sufficiently broad that there would seem to be no doubt that
Congress can confer upon the bankruptcy court the same degree
of control of property undergoing reorganization as heretofore
exercised in the equity courts.
AMENDMENTS PERTAINING TO CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS
AND TO REFERENDUM ON REORGANIZATION PLANS
Greater efficiency in the classification of the claims of creditors
and stockholders was regarded as necessary because of the com-
plexity of the railroad reorganization cases. In the pending
Missouri Pacific case there are fifty thousand bondholders, ten
thousand stockholders, and between two and three thousand gen-
eral unsecured creditors. These have been segregated into
seventy-two separate classes. 9 In some instances the single claim
of one creditor has been put into a separate class, as, for example,
the six million dollar loan of J. P. Morgan and Company to the
aid of reorganization upon the ground of insolvency dealt with railroads or other
public utilities where continued operation of the property and preservation of its
unity seemed to be required in the public interest." First Nat. Bank v. Flershem,
290 U. S. 504, 515, n.7 (1934).
38 Such certificates may take priority over rents and profits arising during the
receivership and over the proceeds from the sale of previously mortgaged property.
Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U. S. 434 (x886). Similarly, it has
been held that where unsecured obligations, incurred not more than six months prior
to insolvency, were necessary to the continued operation of the business, the holders
thereof were entitled to be preferred over bondholders under a previously existing
mortgage. The basis of these decisions is the necessity of continued operation of the
railroad properties. Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., io6 U. S. 286 (1882) ; Gregg
v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U. S. 183 (19o5) ; see Wham, Preference in Railroad
Receiverships (1928) 23 ILL. L. REV. 141.
39 See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., ist
Sess. (1935) 26; SEN. REP. No. 1336, 74 th Cong., ist Seas. (Committee on Interstate
Commerce, 1935) 2.
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Missouri Pacific." This multifarious creation of classes elevated
minorities into a position of undeserved obstructive power. In
part, this power lay in the provisions of the Act, about to be dis-
cussed, pertaining to the approval of plans by the respective
classes, and in part, in the difficulty in the determination of the
value of the property, either for the purpose of determining insol-
vency (it being unnecessary to secure the approval of the equity
holders if insolvency were thus established), or for fixing the value
of interests of dissenters for which a plan made provision for cash
payments. These classification and valuation provisions would
naturally stimulate the obstruction of plans by the minorities in
these many classes, since the possibility of their securing full pay-
ment or preferred treatment as a necessary concession to avoid
elaborate valuation proceedings would tend to encourage their
non-agreement. The smallness of such groups, or putting a single
claim in a class by itself, facilitates quick and aggressive action.
The difficulty of raising cash to pay the claims of such dissenters
constitutes an invitation for inordinate demands as the price of
acquiescence. Consequently, the practical course open to those
promoting reorganizations would be to acquiesce in concessions,
justifiable only because of the tactical strength of such groups, and
often made at the expense of creditors with stronger substantive
rights but in weaker strategic positions. Such considerations indi-
cated the desirability of improvements permitting a more efficient
treatment of minority interests. To this end amendments were
made intended to improve the classification of the creditors and
the manner of their voting, to simplify the valuation, and to make
more workable the provisions permitting the confirmation of plans
not approved by two thirds of the holders in any class of creditors
or stockholders.
In order to prevent undue multiplicity of classes, an amend-
ment was made providing that there shall be no classification into
separate classes in the absence of "substantial differences in pri-
orities, claims, or interests." 41 This provision is as specific as the
40 This claim was ordered to be classified with the claims of Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and Railway Credit Corporation after the passage of the
amended Act. N. Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1935, P- 39, col. 7-
41 Act of Aug. 27, 1935, c. 774, 49 STAr. 916, i U. S. C. A. § 205(c) (7) (Supp.
1935).
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subject matter permits and, interpreted in the light of the Con-
gressional history, should be effective for its purpose.
The Act was amended to facilitate the confirmation of plans by
making unnecessary the securing of the vote of holders who refuse
or neglect to vote or who cannot be located, by providing that the
judge shall confirm the plan if it has been accepted by the desig-
nated majority of the total in each class who vote, rather than of
the total in each class." The effect of the original provisions of
the Section was to count as against the plan all who did not vote.
This was unreasonably obstructive. The stocks and bonds of these
corporations are owned by persons scattered over the world. It
is apparent that in many cases the vote of a substantial percentage
of owners, uninterested and unknown, cannot be obtained. There
is no sound basis for a conclusive presumption that those who are
too uninterested to vote, or who cannot be located, would reject the
plan. The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of
a provision, in a state statute authorizing reorganizations, to the
effect that non-voters are deemed to have assented, following the
analogy of the statutes of limitations which rest on the reasoning
that those who neglect to act may be assumed to have abandoned
their cause of action."3 The amendment seems sound for the same
reason.
Under the amended Act the submission of the plan to creditors
and stockholders is made after the plan has the prestige arising
from its approval both by the Commission and the court."' Prior
to the amendment the submission was made after the approval of
42 Subdivision (e).
43 Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401 (1883). The provisions of the Act
requiring precautions for full notice have been strengthened. The judge must re-
quire the debtor or the trustees to file with the court a list of all known bondholders,
creditors and stockholders, with their last known postoffice address or place of
business. Subdivision (c) (4). A new provision has been added under which it
shall be the duty of anyone having information as to such names and addresses to
divulge such information to the trustee or trustees upon written request therefor.
Upon petition by any party of interest, the judge may order the production of
such information by anyone refusing to divulge it. Subdivision (c) (5). The pur-
pose of this provision is to deprive anyone having such information of any undue
advantage arising from its possession. In the past, certain investment institutions
are said to have had an undue advantage in reorganizations through private in-
formation as to the names and addresses of the security holders.
44 Subdivision (d).
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the Commission but before the confirmation of the court. The
amended Act also provides that the submission itself is to be made
by the Commission. This is in contrast with the practice con-
templated under the original Act whereby reorganization managers
or committees, who were instrumental in putting through a plan,
obtained from creditor and stockholder interests, ordinarily with-
out a disclosure of the particular plan to be proposed, authority to
vote their claims. The difficulty of securing the approval of two
thirds of all outstanding holders tended to stimulate high pressure
methods. Under the arrangement now provided, the Commission,
as a disinterested agency, conducts a referendum of the claim-
ants, who are free from any domination or control by the com-
mittees. This arrangement, in conjunction with the elimination
of the necessity of securing two thirds of the entire number of
claimants in a particular class, and the provisions under which any
interested party can propose a plan, together with those under
which the Commission can approve a plan different from any pro-
posed to it,4" should facilitate the consummation of plans.
AMENDMENTS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE CONFIRMATION
OF PLANS NOT ACCEPTED BY Two THIRDS OF
CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
Section 77, before amendment, permitted reorganizations in
several ways. A plan, when approved by the Commission and
confirmed by the court, could become effective upon acceptance
by two thirds in amount of each class of creditors and stockholders.
If that consent were withheld by any class of creditors, a plan
could nevertheless become effective if it provided for a sale of the
property subject to the lien of such dissenting class, or for a sale
of the property free from such liens at not less than a fair upset
price, or for protection of the creditors by an appraisal of their
interest and the payment in cash either of the value of their claims
or of the securities allotted to them under the plan. Similarly,
where consent of two thirds of any class of stockholders was not
obtained, a plan might become effective where it provided for a
sale of the property at not less than a fair upset price, or where it
protected such interest by providing for an appraisal and a pay-
45 Subdivision (d).
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ment in cash either of the value of the interest, or, at the objecting
stockholders' election, of the value of the securities, if any, allotted
to such stock under the plan. A plan could become effective with-
out the consent of the stockholders if the company were found to
be insolvent (as the result of a determination of the value of the
assets by the court)," or if the plan did not adversely affect such
stockholders, or if they were bound by the company's acceptance
of the plan."
Although these alternatives were authorized, the only practi-
cable one was that which involved a judicial sale of the property
at an upset price. The other alternatives were ineffective because
of the difficulty of obtaining the necessary consent of the junior
creditors and stockholders. Their great number and their being
widely scattered and difficult to locate were in themselves serious
obstacles to obtaining such approvals. The difficulties inherent
in making a valuation of such great properties and the uncer-
tainty as to what its result would be (unless the process were sim-
plified and made definite by suitable amendments) made impracti-
cable either the elimination of the stockholders' approval by the
proof of insolvency, or the resort to cash payment to dissenters of
the appraised value of their interests. In the pending reorganiza-
tion of the St. Louis and San Francisco system, the Commission,
knowing, after twenty-two years' experience with the LaFollette
Valuation Act, the laborious nature of such valuation determina-
tions, recognized the impracticability of an attempt by the court to
determine insolvency on a valuation basis and postponed such ac-
tion until amendment of the statute.48
On the other hand, the restriction of the processes to those in-
volving a sale at an upset price was a serious limitation. The use
of the device of the sale at an upset price in a railroad bankruptcy
statute is an adaptation of legal machinery to a task quite differ-
ent from that for which it was designed or for which it is suitable.49
There ordinarily can be no such thing as a public sale of such
46 Subdivisions (e), (h).
47 Subdivision (e).
48 See Sm. REP. No. 1336, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (Committee on Interstate Com-
merce, 1935) 3; Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong.,
ist Sess. ('935) 26.
49 It has been pointed out that the reorganization technique used in equity is
outmoded machinery adapted to the localized factory or butcher shop. See Swaine,
supra note 6, at 317.
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properties. Were the property put up at an actual auction, the
court would fix an upset price to prevent a chilling of the bidding.
But ordinarily the only possible purchasers at a railroad reorgani-
zation sale are the holders of the majority of the securities of the
old company, and there can be no competitive bidding." The
practice has been, therefore, for the court to set an upset price,
below which it would not confirm a sale and which was sufficiently
low to drive the interested parties into the reorganization. 5 It
has been necessary that the cash allocable to such dissenters be
appreciably less than the value of the securities offered under the
plan." Otherwise they would not take the securities, and the
50 ".. . it rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of railway
mortgages are anything else than the machinery by which arrangements between the
creditors and other parties in interest are carried into effect, and a reorganization
. . . brought about." Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 539 (1883).
"A foreclosure sale is not a foreclosure sale at all but merely a left-handed device to
effect a reorganization." Spring, supra note 6, at 5oi. In Kansas City Terminal Ry.
v. Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445, 455 (1926), the Supreme Court observed: "Prac-
tically, it is impossible to sell the property of a great railroad for cash . .. the
large amount of cash required by the upset price renders the [railroad] Reorganiza-
tion Committee, which ordinarily controls a large majority of the outstanding se-
curities, practically the only bidder." First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504,
526 (1934). See also Frank, supra note 6, at 541, 57o. An outside bidder almost
never appears. See Byrne, Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in SoME LEGAL
PEASES OF CORPORATE FINANCLNG, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1917) 77, 141;
Cravath, Reorganizations of Corporations, id. at 153; Rosenberg, A New Scheme
of Reorganization in CORPORAr REORGANIZATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1924)
i, 5; Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization
(1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132, 137, n.28.
51 After it has been fixed, minority interests have dwindled to insignificance.
Bonbright and Bergerman, supra note 14, at 128; Weiner, supra note 5o, at 132.
52 .. . the courts have been obliged to fix an upset price that does not repre-
sent the full value of a bondholder's interest in the property as a going concern. And
it follows that a dissenting bondholder may be treated with gross unfairness in the
reorganization agreement and yet may be forced to accept these unfair terms
rather than to take the still more niggardly cash settlement that is offered to him if
he remains a dissenter." Bonbright and Bergerman, supra note 14, at 127-28.
See also MOULTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 324. "Deponent has examined the
decrees of foreclosure and sale in many other reorganizations and the quotations of
the market prices of the bonds affected by such reorganizations and has found it the
rule that the minimum bid or upset price fixed by such final decrees, or the bids
actually confirmed by the courts, have uniformly been such as do result in a distri-
bution share for the bonds secured by the foreclosure mortgages substantially less
than the market value of those bonds during the period preceding the promulgation
of the reorganization plan. The relation of the distributive share to the market
value of the bonds has ranged from as low as io% of the market value to as high as
80% of the market value." Deposition of Mr. Sunderland in Weiner, supra note 5o,
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reorganization could not be effected. In practical effect, there-
fore, the only alternative afforded the dissenters has been to ac-
cept the securities of the reorganized company. Under these
circumstances, since no rationale supports the use of the upset
price device, no logic supports the adoption of any particular
theory for fixing what it should be. The pertinent decisions re-
flect this artificiality and are chaotic. Some courts have fixed the
price at an amount equaling the costs of the litigation and the out-
standing receivers' certificates, a basis affording no protection to
dissenting interests; others have used the capitalization of the
present earnings, when they obviously are not indicative of true
value because temporarily depressed; others have used the junk
value when the property cannot be abandoned and abandonment
is not contemplated; many cases are wisely silent as to the basis
of determination." It is, of course, clear that in determining the
rights of the creditors and stockholders, it is not to be assumed
that the property of the magnitude of a large railroad has no value
because it cannot be sold. The very great amount of property
owned by the typical railroad prevents its sale as a unit even if
the railroad is highly prosperous, and yet it may be of very great
value.
It is thus apparent that the upset price device affords no ade-
quate basis for a careful adjudication of the property rights which
depend upon the value of the assets. It does not purport to afford
any actual determination of that value. Nor is the sale what it
purports to be. The sale and the upset price are merely elements
of an artificial procedural technique used to drive creditor and
equity interests into the reorganization plan.
The circumstance, already alluded to, that Section 77 in its
original form was so designed as to be peculiarly susceptible to
abuse by obstructive minorities, coupled with the defects in the
upset price device just described, made it desirable that the pre-
viously unworkable valuation provisions of Section 77 be so im-
proved that creditors or stockholders could be excluded, either
at x43. In the Milwaukee reorganization, under the upset price there fixed, the bonds
had a cash realizable value of $41. The current market appraisal of the value of
the securities offered under the reorganization was $55. See Weiner, supra note 5o,
at 132, 144.
53 See Bonbright and Bergerman, supra note 14, at 127; Weiner, supra note 5o, at
132, 143.
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totally or partially, from participation in a reorganization plan
on the basis of a valuation of the assets determined according to
sound and definite principles and under a simplified evidentiary
practice. Without eliminating the possibility of the use of the
sale at an upset price, it was desirable to make practically effective
the alternative method of reorganization under which a plan could
be consummated without the necessity of a sale of the property,54
and to include provisions making it possible, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, to compel minority holders to accept securities in the
recognized company despite their refusal to assent to the provi-
sions of the plan.
VALUATION PROVISIONS
Amendments simplifying and clarifying the determination of
the valuation were required, because the provisions of the original
Act enabling an elimination of the consent of claimants demon-
strated to have no interest by a valuation, or for the value of whose
interest a cash payment was provided, were regarded as unwork-
able because of the great task of valuing property of such magni-
tude and because of uncertainty as to the results, due to doubt as
to the legal principles governing such a valuation.55 The assign-
ment of the determination to the courts, as provided in the original
Act, was inappropriate. The courts are ordinarily inexperienced
54 Coriell v. White, 54 F.(2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 193), a case which arose in an
equity proceeding and not under a bankruptcy statute, held that while the creditor
is entitled to the cash value of his claim and cannot be compelled against his will to
take new securities in a reorganization, the right to a sale is not a substantial right
but a mere procedural remedy for which in a particular case there may be the sub-
stitution of a substantial equivalent such as appraisal. The point was not passed
upon by the Supreme Court on appeal. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S.
426 (1933). Ample precedent for such a view is found in the decisions refusing to
set aside sales by corporations of substantially all their assets for stock of another
corporation to be distributed to the selling corporation's stockholders, when con-
sented to by substantially all the stockholders, even though there be no statutory
authority for a sale for a consideration other than cash. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921); Jackson Co. v. Gardiner Investment Co., 200
Fed. 113 (C. C. A. ist, 1912); see Maxler v. Freeport Bank, 275 Pa. 510, 513, 119
Atl. 592, 593 (1922). But cf. Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 50 (189o);
see Swaine, supra note 6, at 317, 325.
55 See Bonbright and Pickett, Valuation to Determine Solvency under the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 582; Wehle, supra note 22, at 209; testimony
of Mr. Eastman, in Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th
Cong., ist Sess. (i935) 283 et seq.
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with this technical problem, while the Commission has had ex-
tended experience since I9M3 in its administration of the LaFol-
lette Valuation Act. This experience has indicated great difficulty
in making such determinations, if the kind of value to be deter-
mined in a reorganization case is the same as a value for rate-mak-
ing purposes under the principles of Smyth v. Ames.56 The rate-
making valuation cases tried by the Commission and by the state
commissions are almost without parallel in our litigation in point
of magnitude and complexity." The doctrine of Smyth v. Ames,
that the determination of value for rate-making purposes is a
question of fact to be determined in the light of all the relevant
facts, produces numerous highly controversial issues involving
great detail concerning such things as the present cost of repro-
duction, the original cost to date, the investment, the accrued
depreciation, the value of the land, going value, and working capi-
tal. The obstructive possibilities open to the equity and creditor
interests, through the probability of prolonged hearings and liti-
gation involving these complicated questions, were evident from
the Commission's valuation cases. That the equity interests were
well aware of the strategic value to them of the original provisions
of Section 77 was evidenced by the insistence with which they
fought any simplification of the process. They asserted that value
in a reorganization case is the same as in a rate case."8
The new statute contains provisions similar in substance to
those of the original Act with reference to excluding stockholders
from participation or paying the value of their interest in cash.
Submission of a plan to any class of stockholders is unnecessary
if the Commission finds, and the judge affirms the finding, that
the corporation is insolvent, that their equity has no value, or that
the plan provides for the payment in cash to such class of an
amount not less than the value of its equity, if any. It provides
that submission to the creditors shall be unnecessary if similar
findings are made with reference to them." The amended Act
56 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
57 For a discussion of the delay, complexity, and cost of hearings involving
rate-making valuations, see Brandeis, J., dissenting, in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., April 27, 1936.
58 See Hearings before Committee on Jtdiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., ist
Sess. (1935) 152, 215 et seq., 291 et seq.
59 Subdivision (e). The similar provisions applicable to creditors are that
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carries the following provisions with reference to the determina-
tion of value:
"If it shall be necessary to determine the value of any property for
any purpose under this section, the Commission shall determine such
value and certify the same to the court in its report on the plan. The
value of any property used in railroad operation shall be determined on
a basis which will give due consideration to the earning power of the
property, past, present, and prospective, and all other relevant facts.
In determining such value only such effect shall be given to the present
cost of reproduction new and less depreciation and original cost of the
property, and the actual investment therein, as may be required under
the law of the land, in light of its earning power and all other relevant
facts." 60
The purpose of these provisions is to lodge the determination
of the value in the Commission in the first instance, and to in-
cline the determination away from the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames,6'
under which the value is fixed on the basis of a consideration of
the original and reproduction cost of the property and the invest-
ment therein. The actual value of the property cannot be deter-
mined, nor is it ordinarily evidenced by the investment in the
property or its present cost of construction. The railroads are
competitive properties. The value of their operative property,
for purposes of reorganization, must necessarily be what, for bet-
ter terms, we may call the actual value or the economic worth of
the property, as determined primarily by its present and prospec-
tive earning capacity.62 The actual value of the property depends
upon the demand for its service and its ability to meet the demand
economically. The provisions of the amended statute, therefore,
make clear that emphasis shall be put on a consideration of earn-
ing power, past, present, and prospective. Were the insolvency of
railroad properties to be determined on the basis of the value for
rate-making purposes heretofore made by the Commission, al-
submission to any class shall be unnecessary if the Commission shall have found,
and the judge shall have affirmed the finding, that the interests of such class have
no value or that the plan provides for the payment in cash to such class of
creditors of an amount not less than the value of their interests.
60 Subdivision (e).
61 16g U. S. 466 (1898).
62 Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893);
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 14 U. S. 439 (1894).
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most no railroad in the country would be insolvent, for this so-
called "value" was determined on the basis of the cost of the
property and without any regard for its earning capacity, the Com-
mission having held that a valuation made for the fixation of rates
must be made independently of any consideration of earnings."
This eliminated from consideration the element which in fact pre-
cipitates insolvency - the failure to obtain a return adequate to
meet the claims of creditors.
It was furthermore important to prevent the obstruction of the
hearings by the introduction, where improper, of testimony with
reference to the original and reproduction cost of the property and
the investment therein. In cases involving property of such mag-
nitude, for reasons already explained, such evidence is necessarily
of great bulk and detail and its introduction affords unlimited
possibilities of delay. On the other hand, evidence of the earning
power of the property is comparatively simple. The amendment
does not, however, provide for the exclusion of testimony relative
to the original or reproduction cost or the amount of the invest-
ment, nor does it prescribe its evidentiary effect, if admitted.
The amendment, by its emphasis on earning power,64 permits ex-
clusion of testimony as to the present cost of reproduction new
and original cost unless the admission of such testimony in the
particular case is required by the law of the land. The Supreme
Court, since the passage of these amendments, has affirmed the
63 San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. R., 75 I. C. C. 463 (1923); Kansas City S. Ry.,
84 I. C. C. i3 (1924).
64 In using the language employed, Congress followed the precedent of the
similar, and rather unusual, provisions in § isa of the Interstate Commerce Act, that
in determining the value of property for recapture purposes, the Commission "shall
give due consideration to all the elements of value recognized by the law of the
land for rate-making purposes, and shall give the property investment account of
the carriers only that consideration which under such law it is entitled to in estab-
lishing value for rate-making purposes." 4X STAT. 489 (1920), amended, 48 STAT.
220 (1930), 49 U. S. C. § 15a (1935). Such provisions are cautionary. They are not
intended to prescribe a formula, but to put the Commission on guard. The effective-
ness of such provisions is evidenced by the fact that for a failure to follow the
requirement of a consideration of present reproduction cost among the "elements
of value recognized by the law of the land," the Commission was reversed by the
Supreme Court in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461 (1929).
A more direct prohibition of the receipt or consideration of evidence of cost and
investment would involve danger of invading guarantees of due process, at least
inx some cases.
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Commission in making the distinction between the actual value
and a " value for rate purposes" which is not value at all but a
rate base, and in holding that the cost of reproduction is not or-
dinarily of any weight in determining the actual value. In a case
involving the Commission's determination of the actual value of
property, as distinguished from a rate base, the Court quoted with
approval the Commission's dicta: " Clearly the only pertinent
value is that for purposes of sale or exchange. Cost of reproduc-
tion is to be given little, if any, weight in determining such value,
in the absence of evidence that a reasonably prudent man would
purchase or undertake the construction of property at such a
figure." 11 Under these principles, a court would be justified in
not receiving evidence of the investment in, or the original or re-
production cost of, the operating property unless its present or
prospective earning capacity were adequate to justify the invest-
ment of such sums."
PROVISIONS PER-MTTING CONFIRmATION OF PLANS NOT
ACCEPTED BY Two THRDS OF THE CREDITORS
AND STOCKHOLDERS
Section 77, as originally enacted, employed the principle of the
composition 6 in provisions authorizing confirmation of a plan
65 Atlanta, B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 296 U. S. 33, 39 (1935), gff'g Re
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. and Atlanta, B. & C. R. R., 201 I. C. C. 645 (1934).
Win. 0. Douglas has suggested that the valuation difficulty might be met at least
in part by a rule of thumb that stockholders need not be offered participation if
for a certain period of years prior to bankruptcy or reorganization, the railroad
had not, on an average, earned its fixed charges. Protective Committees in Rail-
road Reorganizations (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 565, 589, n.42. Railroad earnings are
subject to such wide variations, due to local or temporary conditions, that it is
unlikely that any such test period could be selected which would not be unreason-
ably arbitrary.
66 See United States v. Boston and New York Canal Co., 27x Fed. 877,
889 (C. C. A. ist, 1921).
67 " As outlined by that section § 77], a plan of reorganization, when confirmed,
cannot be distinguished in principle from the composition with creditors authorized
by the act of 1867, as amended by the act of 1874." Continental Illinois Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R., 294 U. S. 648, 672 (1935).
The composition was authorized in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, as amended in
x874, and was sustained In re Reiman, 2o Fed. Cas. No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874).
This case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Hanover Nat. Bank v.
Moyses, i86 U. S. 181, z86 (1902), and in Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., supra.
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which became binding on creditor and stockholder minorities when
it had been accepted by two thirds in amount of each class whose
interests would be affected by its provisions, and when it had been
approved by the Commission and confirmed by the court.68 Under
the amended Act a plan would become effective under similar cir-
cumstances.6 9 But for reasons already indicated, the amended
Act goes further and provides that a plan may, in certain circum-
stances, become binding notwithstanding it has not been accepted
by the prescribed vote of the classes of creditors and stockholders.
This provision was added in order to reduce the power of mi-
nority holders to force inequitable adjustments as the price of their
acquiescence.
Under the amended Act, the plan, upon approval by the Com-
mission, is at once certified to the court."0 The judge, after a
hearing, is required to approve the plan if satisfied that, among
other things, it is
" fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each class
of creditors and stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly in favor
of any class of creditors or stockholders, and will conform to the re-
quirements of the law of the land regarding the participation of the
various classes of creditors and stockholders .... 71
The plan is then submitted to the stockholders (submission to any
class being, however, unnecessary if the court shall have found
that the corporation is insolvent, that the equity of the class has
no value, or that the plan provides for the payment in cash of the
value of the equity), and to the creditors (with exceptions simi-
lar 72 to those stated within the foregoing parentheses). If two
thirds in amount of the total of the allowed claims in each class of
creditors, and two thirds of the stock in each class, who vote in the
submission, vote favorably, the judge shall confirm the plan, and it
shall bind the minorities in such classes. Then follow the provi-
sions critical in this discussion: if the plan has not been so ac-
cepted, the judge may nevertheless confirm it if he shall find, after
68 Subdivisions (f) and (g) of § 77 before amendment require the plan to be
equitable, not to discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stock-
holders, to be financially advisable, and to be compatible with the public interest.
69 Subdivisions (e), (f).
70 Subdivision (d).
71 Subdivision (e).
72 See note 59, supra.
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hearing, that it conforms to the provisions stated in the foregoing
indented paragraph and that
"it makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment for the
interests or claims of those rejecting it; that such rejection is not rea-
sonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests of
those rejecting it and all the relevant facts. . .. ,, 7
Under Section 77 before amended, if creditors holding two
thirds in amount of the claims of a class approved a plan, a dis-
senter in such class was bound if the judge found that the plan
was fair and equitable and did not discriminate in favor of any
class of creditors or stockholders. This obviously impairs the
creditors' technical right to have the property subjected to their
foreclosure. That they can be deprived of such rights was fore-
cast by the Supreme Court in Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard J'
and sustained in Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry 5
To what extent does the amendment differ from the original
provisions? Before amendment the Act required that the plan be
found to be fair and equitable and not to discriminate unfairly in
favor of any class. Those provisions remain unchanged, and the
requirement has been added that the plan shall afford due recog-
nition to the rights of each class and shall conform to the require-
ments of the law of the land regarding their participation. Before
the court may override the rejection of the plan, it must, after
hearing, make the additional findings that the plan makes ade-
quate provision for fair and equitable treatment of the interests
or claims of those rejecting it, and that such rejection is not rea-
sonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests
of the rejecters. Thus, where the dissenters have refused to ac-
cept a plan found to meet the requirements of substantive law
determinative of their interest, the court is empowered to inquire
into the reasonableness of their rejection and to overrule it if it
shall find that the rejection is not reasonably justified.
These provisions are valid, it is believed, as a reasonable exer-
73 Subdivision (e).
74 109 U. S. 527 (1883).
75 294 U. S. 648 (1935).
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cise of the bankruptcy power. The breadth and progressiveness
of this power is indicated in the opinion in the Rock Island case
by the following statement of the Court:
"The fundamental and radically progressive nature of these exten-
sions [of the bankruptcy power] become apparent upon their mere
statement. . . . Taken altogether, they demonstrate in a very strik-
ing way the capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions
as they have been disclosed as a result of the tremendous growth of
business and the development of human activities from i8oo to the
present day." "
The bankruptcy clause is limited by the due process clause.
The conception of what is due process is not limited to the vision
of any particular time but is adaptable to the changing needs of
the time. The Supreme Court has said: ". . . while the meaning
of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their appli-
cation must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be
otherwise." '" It has often been held that the requirement of due
process is that the legislation be directed to a proper legislative
purpose, and be neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor capri-
cious." This conception of due process would seem to permit
76 294 U. S. at 671.
77 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387 (1926). In Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, the Court said: "If .. . it is intended to say that
the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a nar-
row conception that Chief justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning -
'We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding,' (McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 3x6, 407) -'a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.'"
290 U. S. 398, 442-43 (i934). Cf. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (U. S.
x85i) ; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (I9o5) ; Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932).
78 " And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means se-
lected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U. S. 398 (I934). ". . . the highest court and most high courts have refused
to regard constitutions as codes, and of late years have more and more made due
process of law whatever process seems due to the demands of the times, as under-
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elimination of the requirement of a favorable vote of the creditors
under circumstances where the reason for the requirement does
not exist. Such is the case where railroad reorganizations are
concerned. The composition principle, whereby minority credi-
tors can be bound by majority vote, was evolved when property
holdings were relatively small, and the insolvent was usually an
individual or a small business. Significance could be attached to
the vote of a majority of such creditors concerning the fairness
and desirability of a particular plan of financial rearrangement.
The interested parties ordinarily knew the debtor and had a first
hand understanding of his comparatively simple problems. On
the other hand, the Missouri Pacific Railroad, to take a typical
case, operates properties in a dozen states; its reorganization in-
volves complex business problems and a highly complicated finan-
cial structure; its uninformed creditors, over fifty thousand in
number, are scattered all over the world. Further, this statute
involves public service corporations which furnish arteries of the
national commerce, in the financial structure of which the public
has an interest, because of its effect upon the capacity of these
corporations to perform quasi-public functions. The signifi-
cance of this distinction is well recognized.7 9 A vote of railroad
creditors or stockholders, under all these circumstances, may be
a factor 80 to be considered with respect to the fairness and prac-
ticability of a reorganization plan, but it can hardly rise to the
stood by the judges of the time being." Hough, Due Process of Law -Today
(i919) 32 HARv. L. Rlv. 218, 233. That the provisions under discussion are not
violative of the creditors' rights under practical conceptions of due process is in-
dicated by the support given them before the House committee by the associated
life insurance companies holding railroad bonds in the amount of $2,ooo,ooo,ooo
out of a total of $3,ooo,ooo,ooo held by all life insurance companies, and by the
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks holding railroad bonds in the
amount of over $i,6oo,ooo,ooo. See Hearings before Committee on Judiciary of
H. R. 6249, 74 th Cong., 1st Sess. (935) 74, 86, Ioi.
79 First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934); see Spaeth, The Re-
organization Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (934) 8 TFz1P. L. Q. 447; Payne,
Fair and Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 20 VA. L. REv. 37, 52;
Note (1933) 42 YALEL. J. 387, 398.
80 It has been pointed out that the assumption that in reorganization matters
the will of the majority is synonymous with justice is by no means universally ac-
cepted. See Weiner, supra note 5o, at 132; CooK, P rCIPLES OF CORORATION LAW
(1925) 621; MouLTox, op. cit. supra note 6, at 36o.
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dignity of an ultimate necessity under the conceptions of the pro-
gressive nature of the bankruptcy power and of due process as
well, which permit the interpretation of powers and limitations
to change to meet new and different conditions. Property rights
generally, and even under the rather anomalous composition de-
vice, are not determined by democratic principles or majority
control. Certainly there is nothing intrinsically indispensable
about the vote of a certain, or any, percentage, especially where a
business affected with a public interest is concerned and where so
many of those voting on the reorganization plans can have little
knowledge of the merits of the issues submitted to them. 1
It is apparent also that, properly understood, the vote of in-
terested parties on the fairness of a reorganization plan in a com-
position of creditors is purely advisory to the court. It is the
court's action, not the vote, which is the force majeure8 2 It is,
therefore, reasonable and within the limits of the due process
clause to substitute for the advisory arrangement heretofore em-
ployed, a more flexible procedure.8 The amended Act does this
by providing that the affirmative advice, which has been hereto-
fore required, may be replaced by a finding of the court that the
81 Cf. Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorgandzation Act (1936) 36 CoL,
L. REV. 27, 35.
S2 In Doty v. Love, 295 U. S. 64 (1935), which involved the constitutionality of
a state statute permitting reorganization of insolvent banks where the reorganiza-
tion plan had been approved by three fourths in amount of creditors and approved
by the superintendent of banks and by the court, the Court said: "The creditors
favoring reorganization, though they be ninety-nine percent, have no power under
the statute to impose their will on a minority. They may advise and recommend,
but they are powerless to coerce. Their recommendation will be ineffective unless
approved by the superintendent. Even if approved by him, it will be ineffective
unless the court, after a hearing, shall find it to be wise and just. Upon such a hear-
ing every objection to the plan in point of law or policy may be submitted and
considered. The decree when made by the Chancellor will represent his own un-
fettered judgment." 295 U. S. at 7o-7I. It would seem that the purpose of the
vote under such a statute is identical with that under the Bankruptcy Act. The
mechanism of the two statutes is fundamentally similar, and no reason is perceived
for distinguishing the function of the vote in one from the other. But cf. Matter
of Title Mtge. & Guar. Co., 264 N. Y. 69, i9o N. E. 153 (1934).
83 In making laws carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution
in the Federal Government, Congress has a choice of means. It may use any means
in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution. United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 396 (U. S. i8o5) ; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
36 (U. S. i8i9); In re Reimer, 2o Fed. Cas. No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. 1874).
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plan makes adequate provision for the treatment of the interests
of those rejecting it and that their rejection is not reasonably
justified in the light of the respective substantive rights of the re-
jecters. This seems a proper substitution especially where, as
here, the plan has been recommended by an independent and in-
formed administrative tribunal.
Some doubt has been expressed as to validity of the provisions
under consideration 84 as a result of the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the case of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rad-
ford,85 in which it held unconstitutional the Frazier-Lemke Act,
an opinion which was before the House committee when it ap-
proved the provisions in question. The Court held that the mort-
gagee could not be deprived by statute of his right to have the
mortgaged property devoted primarily to the satisfaction of his
debt either through receipt of the proceeds through a fair com-
petitive sale, or by taking the property itself. The prohibition
declared by the Court against the impairment of such rights was
not absolute. In both the Radford case and in the Rock Island
case, the Court recognized that the creditors can be deprived of
such rights by a composition statute under which the dissenting
creditors are bound where two thirds of the class have agreed to
a plan and it has been found by the court to be fair and equitable.
The amendments of Section 77 do not affect these rights in a
different degree than the original Act.
In the Radford case the Court expressly held that the Frazier-
Lemke Act was not a composition statute. That statute affected
the debtor-creditor relationship between a farmer and the bank
which held the mortgage on his farm. There was lacking the com-
plexity and multiplicity characteristic of the typical railroad
reorganization which create the procedural difficulties which have
prompted the amendments here in question. As compared with
that simple relationship, the pending Missouri Pacific reorgani-
zation involves property of great size, with eighty-four different
kinds of indebtedness, seventeen mortgages, and seventy-two
classes of interested parties. It is unnecessary to repeat here the
considerations regarded as distinguishing the reorganization of
84 See Friendly, supra note 81, at 34.
85 295 U. S. 55 (1935).
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such a railroad from that of simple industrial or farm property.
The denial of the right to a mortgage sale of a farm for a period
of five years in the Radford case was the taking of a substantial
:ight which was essential to the preservation of the security af-
;orded by the mortgagee. The denial of the right to a foreclosure
sale in a railroad reorganization is not such a taking. The elimi-
nation of the sale of the farm in the Radford case was part of a
deliberate scheme on the part of Congress to cut down the sub-
stantive rights of mortgagees as a protection to a certain class of
debtors in a time of great depression. These particular provi-
sions of Section 77, as amended, are primarily procedural provi-
sions, needed, on account of the multiplicity of claims arising in
the reorganization of a complex property, in order that the sub-
stantive rights of the parties generally may be fully protected
against imposition from obstructive minorities.8 6
The depression created the unmistakable necessity of a com-
prehensive reorganization statute. The maladministration of rail-
road reorganizations inevitably inclined Section 77 toward basic
86 In Tennessee Pub. Co. v. American Nat. Bank, 81 F.(2d) 463 (C. C. A. 6th,
1936), the court held unconstitutional the provisions of subdivision (b) (5) of § 77B
providing for the confirmation of plans despite the disapproval of more than one
third of a class of affected creditors where the plan provides adequate protection for
the interests of dissenting creditors by appraisal and payment in cash of the value
either of such interests or at the objecting creditor's election, of the securities, if any,
allotted to such interests under the plan, or by such method as will in the opinion
of the judge equitably provide such protection. The debtor, all of whose stock had
been acquired by a single individual for the purpose of attempting a reorganization,
presented a plan which was rejected by all the bondholders and by half of the
general creditors. The property was appraised at less than $300,000; the bonded
indebtedness exceeded $9oo,ooo; and the unsecured indebtedness exceeded $3o0,ooo.
Yet the plan provided that the debtor was to retain the property ahid that the ob-
jecting bondholders were to be paid the value of their interest in cash. What the
unsecured creditors were to receive does not appear. The foregoing provisions of the
statute were never intended for use where minor creditor classes or the shareholders
attempt to force a plan on objecting major credit interests, and the court might well
have dismissed the petition on that ground. (1936) 84 U. Or PA. L. REv. 78o. The
court held that these provisions were unconstitutional on the authority of the
Radford decision, and with not thorough discussion of the problem. The considera-
tions which are stated in the text with reference to the Radford case are equally
applicable to this decision and are, it is believed, fully controlling.
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reforms, and toward a more active participation by the govern-
mental agencies. This interposition was necessary in the protec-
tion of the investing public and of the railroads, as instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, as well. It has occurred at a time
when the dominant position held by the bankers in the reorganiza-
tion of these properties is threatened by the public criticisms of
their action in such reorganizations as that of the Milwaukee, the
competition of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the
field of railroad finance, the strict supervision of reorganization
committees provided by the Securities and Exchange Act and by
Section 77 itself, and the critical public attitude expressed by such
public investigations of railroad activities of the bankers as have
been conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and
are now pending in the comprehensive inquiry being conducted
by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. These ele-
ments reflect a sensitive public interest and a changed public atti-
tude. The banking concerns, as motivating factors in reorganiza-
tions, possessed a high effectiveness resulting from their excellent
organization and from the driving processes permissible under
the free play permitted by the accepted methods, the use of some
of which have now been prevented; others, retarded. From a
practical standpoint, if their activity is not to continue in its full
measure, a substitute for its drive must be found, and a machinery
must be established which will adequately meet the new necessi-
ties. In view of its duty to the public, if the government is to
participate more directly in railroad reorganizations, it must do
so with an efficiency commensurate with a responsibility delib-
erately undertaken. The most difficult aspect of a regulatory
and administrative problem of this type lies in the fact that the
governmental interference, established to correct abuses arising
from the uncontrolled efficiency of private initiative, is apt to
create an inefficiency fully as harmful as the abuses. This fre-
quently is the consequence of that ineffectiveness of the demo-
cratic process which results from the multiplicity of counsel and
authority which is apparently one of the essentials of the process
itself. In the administration of this statute, that inefficiency may
arise in part through the unavoidable necessity of the duality of
administration by both the Commission and the courts. This
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duality will destroy the effectiveness of the statute only if the
Commission and the courts fail to rise to the demand of that high
administrative intelligence which the difficult work requires. To
accomplish these reorganizations successfully, these agencies must
have the intelligent and active support of the creditors and stock-
holders. Reorganization plans for properties of such complexity
and magnitude are to be best accomplished not by the imposition
by the government, but by its mediation. How these governmen-
tal agencies can administer a law, designed to prevent abuses
from the exercise of private initiative, in a manner not to destroy,
but to sustain, that initiative, is again the old and difficult prob-
lem of the golden mean. This is not something to be written into
a statute. It lies in the wisdom of its administrators. Against the
failure of the personal equation in the administration of the law,
no provision of the law will protect.
Leslie Craven.
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